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The (Ab)use of Those with No Other Hope?
Ethical and Legal Safeguards for Recipients of
Experimental Procedures
SARA FOVARGUE
The idea that all members of a society have a duty to help promote scientific and
medical advances has been the subject of debate,1 and it has recently been
suggested that patients should be able to participate in ‘‘research that may be
beyond the bounds of current clinical research practice’’ and that ‘‘even when
greater-than-usual risks may be present, such research can be both ethically and
scientifically justified.’’2 This is partly based on the argument that all of us are
obliged to participate in research and that where there is ‘‘some reasonable likelihood
[of] a beneficial effect’’ it is appropriate for ‘‘‘risky’ research’’ to proceed.3 Here I do
not dispute this contention but draw attention to some of the issues that are raised by
involving those with no other hope in experimental procedures. These are important
because of the position—desperately ill with no alternatives—such patients are in. The
UK’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics has recognized that medical progress has
sometimes been made at the ‘‘expense’’ of those who first received a new procedure,
and that ‘‘[i]n some cases, it has been cruel to offer a possible life-saving procedure
that resulted in a long drawn-out painful death, instead of a relatively peaceful end.
The offer of such a procedure in itself puts pressure on patients to accept—and may
distort judgement.’’4 I am not arguing that there should be a blanket ban on in-
volving those with no other hope in experimental procedures; rather, I argue that, if
they are to be involved, then they must be legally protected and that the use of such
procedures is scientifically justified and ethically reviewed.
In this article I examine international and national ethical and professional
guidance on offering experimental procedures to those with no other hope and
explore the common law on experimental procedures in England and Wales. The
issues highlighted here are not jurisdiction specific; rather, the regulatory frame-
work in England and Wales is used as a lens through which to explore and high-
light the protection offered to those with no other hope. In so doing I question
whether the existing regulatory structures appropriately protect those with no
other hope and draw on ethical guidance from New Zealand that suggests ways to
proceed. Care must be taken with involving such patients in experimental pro-
cedures because they may be particularly vulnerable and open to exploitation,
even if this is not the deliberate or conscious aim of those seeking to perform the
procedure for the first time. Despite this risk, selection issues in this context have
rarely been considered. This may be because their involvement has been assumed
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to be unproblematic, because if the patients are competent, they can give their
informed consent to participate and are also able to make other ‘‘risky’’ choices,
such as refusing life-saving treatment.5 However, justice may limit the harms to
which a person can be subjected,6 and if it is acceptable to involve those with no
other hope in experimental procedures, then it is imperative that they are
appropriately protected. At the same time, their ability to access opportunities to
prolong or save their lives should not be unnecessarily impeded.
Definitional Dilemmas
One of the problems in this field is that it is unclear what an experimental
procedure is. Terms such as ‘‘research,’’ ‘‘experiment,’’ ‘‘treatment,’’ ‘‘procedure,’’
‘‘therapy,’’ and ‘‘practice’’ and the adjectives ‘‘new,’’ ‘‘innovative,’’ or ‘‘experimental’’
are used interchangeably and inconsistently in existing literature,7 possibly because
some of these terms are not legally defined. For example, the UK’s Royal College of
Physicians (RCP) discusses ‘‘medical research,’’ ‘‘medical practice,’’ and ‘‘innovative
medical practice’’ in the same paragraph, followed by ‘‘innovative therapy’’ and
then the specific provisions relating to ‘‘new interventional procedures,’’ which
are also (confusingly) termed ‘‘an experiment.’’8 Research in the form of a clinical
trial is statutorily defined in England and Wales,9 as is ‘‘intrusive research’’
involving those without legal capacity.10 Outside of these situations, the law does
not assist, so ‘‘therapy,’’ ‘‘treatment,’’ ‘‘experiment(al),’’ ‘‘new,’’ or ‘‘innovative’’ are
not defined. A number of bodies, including the RCP, Department of Health (DH),
and the General Medical Council (GMC), define ‘‘research,’’ but these definitions are
not legally binding, although they are professionally important.11 The DH has,
however, defined an ‘‘interventional procedure’’ as ‘‘one used for diagnosis or treat-
ment that involves incision, puncture, entry into a body cavity, electromagnetic or
acoustic energy,’’ and ‘‘[a]n interventional procedure should be considered new if
a doctor no longer in a training post is using it for the first time in his or her NHS
clinical practice.’’12
This definition of a new interventional procedure (NIP) may encompass some
of the activities that are elsewhere called experimental (or novel or innovative)
procedures (or therapies or treatments or practices). For example, in New Zealand
‘‘innovative practice’’ involves ‘‘the provision of a clinical intervention (diagnostic,
therapeutic or prophylactic), be it a therapeutic drug, medical device or clinical
procedure, that is untested, unproven or not in common use and therefore poses
its own unique set of characteristics and issues.’’13 The goal is to ‘‘provide some
immediate treatment in relation to an individual consumer or consumer group
concerned’’ and performing it ‘‘may be considered to be a planned deviation from
current accepted practice of a New Zealand body of health professionals involving
an untested or unproven clinical intervention intended to be used on an ongoing
basis.’’14 Not every deviation from accepted practice should be deemed as in-
novative, and professional judgment, preferably following consultation with relevant
experts, will determine whether something is an innovative practice.15 If it is unclear
whether an intervention is an innovative practice, then an ethics committee should
be consulted.16
The lack of clear legal definitions immediately places potential recipients in
a regulatory grey area, as it may be unclear whether a procedure is (or should be)
declared research, a NIP, or an experimental procedure. Their legal protection is
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thus questionable. There is undoubtedly a fine line between experimental
procedures/therapies/treatments and research, and although it may be theoret-
ically and practically difficult to distinguish between these activities (and it may
not ethically matter what something is called),17 it is necessary to do so, as dif-
ferent legal regulatory schemes apply to each. Indeed, clinical trials are stat-
utorily regulated in England and Wales;18 medical research not included within
this scheme is regulated by a combination of the common law, guidance from
professional bodies,19 and any requirements imposed by ethics committees,20
and NIPs are regulated by nonlegally binding guidelines from the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE).21 Experimental procedures
may fall within one of these regulatory schemes; otherwise the common law
will apply.
To be clear, here I use ‘‘experimental procedure’’ to mean ‘‘novel and un-
validated . . . an ‘experiment’ is a procedure adopted on the chance of its suc-
ceeding.’’22 It ‘‘consists in the performance of a new or non-standard intervention as
all or part of a therapeutic activity and not as part of a formal research project.’’23 I
employ this term to highlight the fact that using it is an experiment (a test), as it has
not previously been clinically used, and it is not known what will happen when it is
used in or performed on a human. It cannot yet be called ‘‘treatment’’ or ‘‘therapy’’
because both of these terms suggest that it has proven benefit, and this is not so
where the relevant activity has not been clinically tried.24 The term ‘‘procedure’’ is
also appropriately neutral and covers a wide range of activities.
Identifying the Problem
Involving those with no other hope in experimental procedures raises a number of
questions,25 but here my focus is on how experimental procedures are regulated
and whether the particular situation of those with this health status is recognized
and additional protection thereby afforded to them. Such patients may be offered
experimental procedures because there are no other alternatives for them, and they
may accept because of the chance of benefit, even though it is more likely that the
results will benefit others. It is understandable why they would want to take this
chance, but what society asks of people ‘‘reflect[s] how we as a society value
individuals and what we consider to be fair and reasonable burdens.’’26 Therefore, it
is important to consider what we ask of those with no other hope. Three questions
underpin my concerns: Does asking those with no other hope to receive an exper-
imental procedure untested on humans imply that their lives are less valuable, or
does it indicate that their lives remain of value and so we strive to prolong them?
Can (and should) limits be placed on who and what experimenters ask, because the
very act of asking makes the other person feel under some duty or responsibility to
agree? At the same time, should those with no other hope be denied the smallest,
remotest chance of benefit, or is it discriminatory and unethical to automatically
exclude them from experimental procedures?
Being the first recipient of an experimental procedure can be advantageous; for
example, the first allotransplant patients were viewed as ‘‘esteemed and heroic
companions in a perilous but promising group endeavour that makes ‘front-line’
kindred of all participants.’’27 As such they were given special considerations, were
involved in their treatment almost as professional medical peers, and were provided
with technical information about their disorders and the experiments they were
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participating in; in addition, the shared ‘‘awareness of impending death’’ further
intensified the relationship between the medical team and their patients.28 The
health professionals caring for those with no other hope may well be frustrated by
the lack of options for their patient and thus may, understandably, want to try an
experimental procedure when there is no other alternative. This frustration may
not be confined to these professionals, and some patients with no other hope enroll
in clinical trials because there is no standard treatment for them.29 Others have sought
to characterize experimental procedures as treatment because they represent their
only hope of improving or extending their life.30 Participation is thus not ‘‘an un-
qualified sacrifice’’ but ‘‘a potentially risky opportunity,’’31 and involvement can
provide unexpected benefits, such as uncovering previously unknown abnormali-
ties.32 Conversely, providing experimental therapies or drugs outside a clinical trial,
for example, raises safety issues, may minimize the number of participants sub-
sequently available for trials, and undermines the clinical trial process.33
Concern over the possible (ab)use of those with no other hope is not hypothetical,
because such patients received the first artificial cardiac devices, were involved in
initial allotransplants, and took part in the nongenetically engineered xenotrans-
plants performed in the 1960s.34 It has recently been suggested that experimental
cancer drugs and stem cell ‘‘therapies’’ should involve those who are terminally ill,35
and that only patients at risk of dying and with no alternative treatment available
should be included in a genetically engineered xenotransplant trial.36 Notably, in
2006 the English High Court sanctioned a patient in a persistent vegetative state
receiving experimental ‘‘treatment.’’37 Thus, it is important to consider the extent to
which such patients are currently protected.
Ethical Guidance on Providing Experimental Procedures
Unless it is assumed that international ethical guidance on medical research also
applies to experimental procedures, there is no specific international ethical guid-
ance on providing these procedures. If this research guidance does apply then, for
example, the Declaration of Helsinki (the Declaration)38 and the Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) and World Health
Organization (WHO) guidelines39 would require a protocol that is ethically re-
viewed and approved before the procedure is performed, and it must include
a risk-benefit analysis in which the latter outweighs the former.40 Informed consent
is also required prior to participation.41 These preconditions aim to ensure that the
protocol reflects the principles of respect for persons and autonomy, beneficence,
nonmaleficence, and justice, which are specifically noted in the CIOMS and WHO
research guidelines,42 and implied in the Declaration.43 Alongside these more general
provisions regarding research and (presumably) experimental procedures, the
Declaration also states that
[i]n the treatment of a patient, where proven interventions do not exist
or have been ineffective, the physician, after seeking expert advice, with
informed consent from the patient or a legally authorized representa-
tive, may use an unproven intervention if in the physician’s judgement it
offers hope of saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating suffering.
Where possible, this intervention should be made the object of research,
designed to evaluate its safety and efficacy.44
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This vague and wide-ranging justification appears to support the use of experimental
procedures for those with no other hope, but there is no indication as to how, or
whether, the doctor’s judgment is assessed other than via the advice of unspecified
‘‘experts.’’ Although this provision sits under the heading ‘‘Additional Principles for
Medical Research Combined with Medical Care,’’ it permits unproven interventions
(experimental procedures in my terminology) to be performed outside of a research
project. If this occurs, it is unclear whether a protocol and/or ethics committee
approval is required, although the first provision of the Declaration states that ‘‘[t]he
Declaration is intended to be read as a whole and each of its constituent paragraphs
should not be applied without consideration of all other relevant paragraphs.’’45
With regard to any specific issues raised by recruiting and involving those with no
other hope, the Declaration is silent.
In contrast, the CIOMS and WHO research guidelines state that ‘‘[s]pecial
justification is required for inviting vulnerable individuals to serve as research
subjects and, if they are selected, the means of protecting their rights and welfare
must be strictly applied.’’46 ‘‘Vulnerable’’ persons include ‘‘patients with incurable
disease,’’ and ‘‘[p]atients who have serious, potentially disabling or life-threatening
diseases are highly vulnerable.’’ The commentary to Guideline 13 notes that
‘‘[p]hysicians sometimes treat such patients with drugs or other therapies not yet
licensed for general availability because studies designed to establish their safety and
efficacy have not yet been completed’’ and declares that this ‘‘‘compassionate use’ . . .
not properly regarded as research’’ contributes to ‘‘ongoing research into the safety and
efficacy of the interventions used.’’47 Compassionate use is regarded as compatible
with paragraph C32 of the 2002 version of the Declaration of Helsinki, which was
similar to and preceded C35, noted previously. With regard to selecting (research)
participants, the CIOMS and WHO guidelines state that care should be taken to
ensure that the benefits and burdens are equitably distributed, and the exclusion of
groups or communities who might benefit from participation must be justified.48 In
particular, ‘‘[m]embers of vulnerable groups . . . have the same entitlement to access
to the benefits of investigational interventions that show promise of therapeutic benefit
as persons not considered vulnerable, particularly when no superior or equivalent
approaches to therapy are available.’’49 Those with no other hope should thus have
the opportunity to benefit from being involved (in research), provided the patient
or his or her legal representative consents.50 As vulnerable groups should have
the chance to benefit from research, and the ‘‘compassionate use’’ of drugs or
therapies ‘‘not properly regarded as research’’ is endorsed, it appears that exper-
imental procedures can be performed on those with no other hope under the CIOMS
and WHO ethical research guidelines.
Although these international guidelines are important, they are just guidelines—
guides to practice—and it is not mandatory to follow them. In England andWales, the
GMC’s guidelines are the most important professional ethical guidance for doctors
because failure to comply with them may result in disciplinary action.51 The GMC’s
research guidelines do not apply to ‘‘innovative treatments designed to benefit
individual patients,’’52 but its guidance on consent and confidentiality do.53 The
consent guidance requires that patients are given the information they ‘‘want or
need’’ on whether what is proposed ‘‘is part of a research programme or is an inno-
vative treatment designed specifically for their benefit,’’ and that they are told ‘‘how
the proposed treatment differs from the usual methods, why it is being offered, and
if there are any additional risks or uncertainties.’’54 The GMC offers no further
The (Ab)use of Those with No Other Hope?
185
guidance on providing experimental, new, or innovative procedures, treatments, or
therapies and does not require a protocol for ‘‘innovative treatment’’ or for it to be
approved by an ethics committee. Similarly, in the case of ‘‘innovative therapy,’’ the
RCP’s guidelines state that clinicians should be prepared to ‘‘both ethically and
scientifically’’ justify its use if challenged,55 but the RCP does not require a protocol
or ethics committee approval. Rather, reliance is placed on individual professional
judgment as to the suitability of and justification for its use.
In comparison, the New Zealand Ministry of Health’s standards for ethics com-
mittees do apply to innovative practices.56 A protocol is thus required that must
be ethically reviewed,57 and the ethics committee must be satisfied with the in-
formation available for a patient to make an informed decision, that the purpose is
to treat a condition of a particular patient or group, that there are ‘‘appropriate
safeguards’’ for independent clinical assessment so that if necessary the patient(s)
can change to standard treatment instead, and there are ‘‘appropriate evaluative
mechanisms’’ to assess the effectiveness of the practice.58 The standards set out
seventeen pieces of information to be considered by the committee, including the
purpose, justification, and clinical indications for using the innovative practice;
how recipients are to be selected; the information they will receive; and how
informed consent will be obtained.59 Although these provisions are more specific
and extensive than those set out in professional guidance in England and Wales, in
neither jurisdiction is there a sense that providing an experimental procedure to
those with no other hope raises specific legal or ethical problems.
The Law on Providing New Interventional Procedures and Experimental
Procedures in England and Wales
Experimental procedures are neither defined nor statutorily regulated, but they
may be regulated under HSC 2003/011 if they fall within the definition of a NIP.
If so, a practitioner who wants to perform a NIP should seek approval from his
or her NHS trust’s clinical governance committee and should notify the
Interventional Procedures Programme at the NICE if the procedure is not
already listed by the NICE.60 If it is not listed, then once the NICE is notified of a
NIP, a brief overview of the evidence of its safety and efficacy will be prepared,
specialist advisors will be consulted, a NICE advisory committee will decide
whether to issue guidance on it or to ask for more information, and the public
will be consulted on the guidance.61 A NIP should only be approved for use if
(1) the doctor has met externally set standards of training; (2) patients are made
aware of the procedure’s special status and the lack of experience of its use,
are informed of the ‘‘anticipated benefits and possible adverse effects’’ of the
procedure and any alternatives—including no treatment—and understand
‘‘that the procedure’s safety and efficacy is uncertain,’’ as part of the consent
process; and (3) the proposed arrangements for clinical audit are sound and
capture data on clinical outcomes that can be used to review its continued use.62
However,
in rare circumstances, where no other treatment options exist, there may be a
need to use a new procedure in a clinical emergency so as not to place a
patient at serious risk. If a doctor has performed a new interventional
procedure in such circumstances he/she must inform the Clinical
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Governance Committee within 72 hours. The Committee will consider
approval of the procedure for future use.63
A NIP can thus be clinically used in this situation and without ethical or other
review or notification.
There are five important points to note about this circular. First, it was due
for review on November 12, 2010, but nothing further has been published.64
Its status is thus unclear, and if it no longer applies, an additional gap in the
regulation of NIPs exists. Second, if the NICE decides that what is proposed is
a NIP under HSC 2003/011 then it does not have to be ethically reviewed, and
the relevant doctor or experimenter will determine who receives it. Third, the
circular does not apply to a procedure that meets the definition of a NIP but that
is being used within an ethics committee–approved trial.65 Thus, some NIPs will
be reviewed by an ethics committee and others will not, including those per-
formed ‘‘where no other treatment options exist.’’66 Fourth, the legal status of
health service circulars is unclear. These circulars are ‘‘[f]ormal communications,
primarily to NHS chief executives, which usually contain a requirement for significant
or urgent specific action. Many are quasi-legislative.’’67 The legal status of HSC 2003/011
is unclear, and there are no sanctions included within it for noncompliance.
Similarly, NICE guidance itself is not legally binding, although there is an expectation
that professionals will take it ‘‘fully into account’’ when exercising clinical
judgment.68 It does not, however, ‘‘override the individual responsibility of health
professionals to make appropriate decisions according to the circumstances of the
individual patient in consultation with the patient’’; thus, ‘‘[i]f, having considered
that guidance, a health professional considers that the treatment or procedure would
be the appropriate option in a given case, there is no legal bar on the professional
recommending the treatment or on the NHS funding it.’’69 If the doctor or
experimenter does not follow NICE guidance, then he or she may rely on the
common law to establish that the decision to offer a patient a NIP was justified. This
is the position if an experimental procedure is deemed not to fall within the
definition of a NIP in HSC 2003/011. The Bolam test obviously cannot be used to
support such a decision, because, when the procedure is experimental, it is unlikely
that there will be a responsible body of medical opinion to support its use,70 but
‘‘where the patient’s condition is very serious and the standard treatment is
ineffective, a doctor will be justified in taking greater risks in an attempt to provide
some effective treatment.’’71
Finally, the provisions in HSC 2003/011 regarding the consent process suggest
that recipients of NIPs must be legally competent.72 Applying the common law on
consent to treatment to NIPs and experimental procedures, a competent person can
(presumably) consent to such provided they are informed ‘‘in broad terms of the
nature of the procedure which is intended.’’73 The House of Lords has recognized
that it is possible to consent to procedures such as surgery, even though this will
necessarily cause bodily harm ‘‘on the upper side of the critical level,’’ provided it is
‘‘performed in accordance with good medical practice and with the consent of the
patient.’’74 In the research context this would mean that ethics committee approval
was sought, and the same might also apply to NIPs and experimental procedures,
but ‘‘good medical practice’’ in this area is legally unclear and untested, and, of
course, NICE guidance on NIPs does not require ethical review. Whether those
who lack the legal capacity to consent can also receive NIPs and experimental
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procedures is similarly uncertain, but, as I now discuss, common law suggests that
incapacity is no bar.
Providing an Experimental Procedure in Practice
Judicial dicta on providing experimental procedures in England and Wales are
limited, but in Simms v. Simms75 JS and JA suffered from probable variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), and, at that time, there were no recognized
effective drugs to halt neurological deterioration or prolong life. Research on
nonhuman animals indicated that pentosan polysulphate (PPS) inhibited the
abnormal prion proteins that caused the neurological damage, but the effect of
PPS on humans at an advanced stage of vCJD (such as JS and JA) was unknown.
Because of their illnesses, JS and JA were unable to consent to PPS, and so their
parents sought a declaration that it would be lawful to provide it to them in their
best interests. Three of the four experts who gave evidence concluded that
providing PPS was in JS and JA’s best interests. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P.
stated that JS and JA lacked the capacity to decide for themselves and that
‘‘[w]here there is no alternative treatment available and the disease is progressive
and fatal, it seems . . . to be reasonable to consider experimental treatment with
unknown benefits and risks, but without significant risks of increased suffering to
the patient, in cases where there is some chance of benefit to the patient.’’76
Furthermore, ‘‘[a] patient who is not able to consent to pioneering treatment ought
not to be deprived of the chance in circumstances where he would have been
likely to consent if he had been competent.’’77 Participation in ‘‘pioneering
treatment’’ thus appears open to all, but Dame Butler-Sloss was ‘‘unclear’’
whether providing PPS to those without capacity would fall within the Bolam
test.78 Nevertheless, she noted that it could not be ‘‘allowed to inhibit medical
progress,’’ and ‘‘if one waited for the ‘Bolam test’ to be complied with to its fullest
extent, no innovative work . . . would ever be attempted.’’79 Thus, although
there was not a professional body of opinion endorsing PPS treatment, there was
‘‘evidence from responsible medical opinion which does not reject the research,’’80
so ‘‘it would not in itself be irresponsible or unethical to give the treatment to
these patients.’’81 There was ‘‘a responsible body of relevant professional opinion
which supports this innovative treatment,’’ subject to the seriousness of the risks
involved and the degree of benefit that might be achieved, and the reasonable-
ness of the risks should be discussed within the patients’ best interests.82 The
benefits of PPS were ‘‘less tangible and more difficult to assess,’’83 and there
could be no obvious benefit or no benefit at all; however, ‘‘it [could not] be said
that in principle this is treatment which is clearly futile or that it would not, in
suitable cases be proper to give the PPS treatment to those suffering from prion
disease, and I am therefore satisfied that the proposed PPS treatment complies
with the ‘Bolam test.’’’84
The decision in Simms v. Simms is important because it involves what Dame
Butler-Sloss variously termed ‘‘experimental,’’ ‘‘pioneering,’’ and ‘‘innovative’’
‘‘treatment’’ that had not previously been used on humans, and the intended
recipients were in a terminal, no-other-hope situation. The precedent value of this
case is unclear because ‘‘[t]he extreme nature of the circumstances alone means
that similar facts are likely to arise only rarely’’85; nevertheless, it indicates that
a court can approve the use of an experimental procedure (‘‘treatment’’) for those
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with no other hope outside a clinical trial and without its attendant support
mechanisms, including ethical review.
Conclusion
Experimental procedures must be ethically performed, and involving someone
who is dying ‘‘anyway’’ does not excuse unethical investigations. The issues
raised here must be considered so that the most seriously ill and understandably
desperate patients are not used as mere tools for society’s apparent benefit. In
some situations in which experimental procedures are being considered for
clinical use, additional guidelines may be drafted that might address recipient
selection and some of the concerns expressed here. But this is not always the case,
and such guidelines are not mandatory. For example, a genetically engineered
solid organ xenotransplant can be clinically performed in England and Wales outside
the context of a clinical trial or research approved by a research ethics committee,
as ‘‘experimental medicine’’; in this situation, approval is only required from the
trust’s clinical governance committee under HSC 2003/011.86 That this is the case is
extraordinarily worrying, given the risks of this developing biotechnology.87 I am
not arguing that those with no other hope should not be able to receive experimental
procedures (or participate in research); rather, I argue that their involvement must be
carefully considered and their safety and health (however limited) protected. As
such, a legal definition of an experimental procedure is required, and such pro-
cedures, as well as NIPs as defined by the DH in HSC 2003/011, must be performed
under a protocol that is subject to ethical review. Thus, the New Zealand system
relating to innovative practices should be considered. Without such it is hard to see
how help and harm can be balanced in the light of hope, but this is necessary to
ensure that exploitation of those with no other hope is minimized.
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